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Abstract
Security policy for SELinux is usually created by cus-
tomizing a sample policy called refpolicy. However,
describing and verifying security policy configurations
is difficult because in refpolicy, there are more than
100,000 lines of configurations, thousands of elements
such as permissions, macros and labels. The memory
footprint of refpolicy which is around 5MB, is also a
problem for resource constrained devices.
We propose a security policy configuration system
SEEdit which facilitates creating security policy by a
higher level language called SPDL and SPDL tools.
SPDL reduces the number of permissions by integrated
permissions and removes label configurations. SPDL
tools generate security policy configurations from access
logs and tool user’s knowledge about applications. Ex-
perimental results on an embedded system and a PC sys-
tem show that practical security policies are created by
SEEdit, i.e., describing configurations is semiautomated,
created security policies are composed of less than 500
lines of configurations, 100 configuration elements, and
the memory footprint in the embedded system is less than
500KB.
Tags: security, security policy, configuration, SELinux
1 Introduction
Attackers can do everything in traditional Linux when
they obtain the almighty root privilege by exploiting se-
curity holes in services running as root, or by exploiting
vulnerabilities leading to privilege escalation[3][4]. To
restrict such behavior of root, Security-Enhanced Linux
(SELinux)[1][2] has mandatory access control feature;
all processes including root processes can access re-
sources only when a security policy permits the access.
The mandatory access control model is called TE (Type-
Enforcement)[5]. In TE, processes are assigned domain
labels, and resources such as files and ports are assigned
type labels, and what kind of domain can access what
kind of type is described in a security policy. If the
security policy is properly configured, all processes in-
cluding root, attackers processes and viruses have only
limited access rights. As a result, the damage by at-
tackers and viruses is confined. Because of this con-
finement feature, SELinux is included in major Linux
distributions[6], and is used for servers that require high
level security. SELinux is also useful for network con-
nected embedded devices such as cell phones and TVs.
Actually, some Linux distributions for embedded system
include SELinux[7].
To deploy SELinux to a system, a security policy must
be created. The security policy is usually created by
customizing a sample policy called refpolicy (Reference
Policy)[8][9]. Refpolicy can be applied with almost no
customization when configurations for applications in a
target system are included in refpolicy. For example, ref-
policy is almost perfectly configured for default appli-
cations included in Fedora and CentOS. However, cus-
tomizing refpolicy is required for systems where refpol-
icy is not configured enough, such as embedded sys-
tems and systems where commercial applications are de-
ployed.
There are three problems in the customization. First,
it is difficult to describe configurations because there are
more than 700 permissions and 1000 macros. In addi-
tion, type labels must be associated with file names and
network resources. Second, it is difficult to verify refpol-
icy. Since refpolicy is intended for multiple use cases,
many configurations, more than 100,000 lines, are in-
cluded. When engineers verify refpolicy before reuse,
they have to review such a lot of configurations. Third is
a problem of resource consumption. When SELinux is
applied to resource constrained systems such as embed-
ded systems, the files used and memory consumed by the
security policy are a problem because refpolicy is large.
This paper proposes a security policy configuration
system SELinux Policy Editor (SEEdit) that facilitates
creating security policy by a higher level language called
Simplified Policy Description Language (SPDL) and
SPDL tools.
• SPDL
Instead of complicated macros, we propose a higher
level language called SPDL. SPDL simplifies de-
scribing and verifying SELinux security policy con-
figurations with two features. Firstly, integrated
permissions in SPDL reduce the number of per-
missions by grouping related SELinux permissions.
Secondly, it removes type configurations by identi-
fying resources with names such as path name and
port number.
• SPDL tools
To solve the verification and size problems of ref-
policy, the security policy is created by writing only
the necessary configurations in SPDL without ref-
policy. SPDL tools help the writing process by gen-
erating configurations using access logs and knowl-
edge of users about applications.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
Problems in creating security policy (section 2), ap-
proaches of SEEdit to facilitate creating security policy
(section 3) are explained. The detail of SEEdit (section
4), experimental results (section 5) are shown. Finally,
related works (section 6), summary (section 7) and fu-
ture works (section 8) are described.
2 Problems in creating security policy
In this section, problems in creating a security policy for
a target system based on refpolicy are described after an
overview of SELinux policy language and refpolicy.
2.1 SELinux policy language
The security policy is loaded to SELinux kernel in binary
representation. However, it is hard to handle the binary
security policy because it is unreadable for humans. To
represent the security policy in text, SELinux has a basic
policy language[10], which is mainly composed of the
following four syntax elements.
(1) Assigning types
In SELinux, type labels must be assigned to re-
sources to identify them. For example, the follow-
ing statement is written to assign types to files.
<file name> system u:object r:<type>
Similar statements are used to assign types to net-
work resources such as port numbers and NICs.
(2) Label declaration
Domains and types must be declared by type state-
ments as shown below.
type <type or domain>, <attribute>;
<attribute> is used to inherit configurations which
are described for <attribute>. For example, in the
following statements, admin t can read both http-
content t and ftpcontent t.
type httpcontent_t, content;
type ftpcontent_t, content;
allow admin_t content:file read;
(3) Allowing access
The allow statement permits a domain to access a
type as in the following syntax.
allow <domain> <type> <permission>;
<permission> is composed of object classes and
access vector permissions. Object class means clas-
sification of resources such as file (normal file), dir
(directory) and tcp socket (TCP socket). For each
object class, access vector permissions such as read
and write are defined. For example, permission file
read means reading normal files, dir read means
reading directories.
(4) Conditional policy expression
To support multiple use cases in one security policy,
SELinux policy language has conditional policy ex-
pressions as follows.
if(<parameter>){<statement>}
When <parameter> is true, then <statement> is
enabled. For example, when CGI is necessary, the
parameter httpd enable cgi is set true, and then ac-
cesses related to using CGI are permitted. Change
of such parameters are applied without reloading se-
curity policy, because <statement> is embedded in
the security policy.
2.2 Overview of refpolicy
To grant enough permissions for applications to work
correctly, a lot of access rules should be described. In
fact, the total number of access rules in a system of-
ten becomes more than 10,000, and sometimes exceeds
100,000. Therefore, it is not realistic to create security
policy by writing configurations in SELinux policy lan-
guage from nothing. To facilitate creating security pol-
icy, a sample policy called refpolicy is developed and
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maintained by the SELinux community. Refpolicy is
composed of macros and configurations for typical ap-
plications.
(1) Macros
M4[11] macros are defined to describe frequently
used phrases in short words. Below is an example.
allow httpd_t contents_t r_file_perms;
define(‘r_file_perms’,‘file { read
getattr lock ioctl }’)
r file perms is a macro, which is expanded to per-
missions related to reading regular files.
(2) Configurations for typical applications
Configurations for applications shipped with Linux
distributions are prepared by the SELinux commu-
nity and Linux distributors, and they are included in
refpolicy. Figure 1 is part of the configuration for
the http daemon. There are many macros, such as
init daemon domain, apache content template and
so on. In the figure, conditional expressions are
omitted, but in fact, many conditional expressions
are also included because refpolicy is intended to
support as many use cases as possible, such as CGI,
PHP and DB connection.
2.3 Problems in creating security policy us-
ing refpolicy
Customizing refpolicy is necessary when the use case of
the system or its installed applications are beyond the ex-
pectations of refpolicy. For example, embedded systems
and commercial applications are not within the scope
of refpolicy. However, there are three problems in cus-
tomizing refpolicy. One is the difficulty in describing
configurations, second is the difficulty of verifying ref-
policy and third is resource consumption.
2.3.1 Difficulty in describing configurations
The major difficulty in describing configurations is com-
plicated configuration elements such as permissions,
macros and types. The main reason of difficulty is the
number of configuration elements. For example, there
are more than 700 permissions and more than 1,000
macros and 1,000 types. In addition, nested macro defi-
nitions make understanding macros harder.
There are two more difficulties in types. First, en-
gineers have to get used to types because in traditional
Linux, they have been identifying files by file names not
types. Secondly, there is also a problem of dependency in
assigning new types. This problem is explained with an
example. When the foo t type is assigned under /foo di-
rectory and the bar t domain is allowed to read the foo t
# Assign httpd_t domain to http daemon
1 type httpd_t;
2 type httpd_exec_t;
3 role system_r types httpd_t;
4 init_daemon_domain(httpd_t,httpd_exec_t)
5 /usr/sbin/httpd -- gen_context(system_u
:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0)
# Permit httpd_t to read /var/www
6 apache_content_template(sys)
7 /var/www(/.*)? gen_context(system_u
:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0)
8 allow httpd_t httpd_sys_content_t:dir
list_dir_perms;
9 read_files_pattern(httpd_t,httpd_sys_
content_t,httpd_sys_content_t)
10 read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t,httpd_
sys_content_t,httpd_sys_content_t)
# Permit httpd_t to wait connection on
tcp port 80
11 corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(httpd_t)
12 corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_t)
13 corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(httpd_t)
14 corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if(httpd_t)
15 corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(httpd_t)
16 corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes(httpd_t)
17 corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_t)
18 corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_t)
19 corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(httpd_t)
20 corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(httpd_t)
21 gen_context(system_u:object_r:http_port
_t,s0)
Figure 1: Part of the configuration for the http daemon in
refpolicy
type, the bar t domain can read all files under the /foo
directory. Next, if the foo2 t type is newly created, and
assigned to the file /foo/foo2. the bar t domain can not
access /foo/foo2 because the bar t domain is not allowed
to access foo2 t. In this way, the bar t domain was able
to read /foo/foo2 before assigning the new type foo2 t,
but bar t can not access /foo/foo2 after the new type is
assigned to /foo/foo2.
2.3.2 Difficulty in verifying refpolicy
For the purpose of Quality Assurance for a security pol-
icy which is created based on refpolicy, refpolicy should
be verified. In this context, verify means understand what
is configured, then find misconfigurations and modify
them. However, it is difficult to verify because of the
complexity of the configuration elements as stated be-
fore. In addition, the following points make verification
more difficult.
• Amount of configurations
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The size of refpolicy makes verification more dif-
ficult. For example, refpolicy included in Fe-
dora 9 has configurations for almost all applica-
tions shipped with Fedora 9 and is composed of
more than 2,000 types and more than 150,000 ac-
cess rules.
• Conditional expressions
Many conditional expressions are embedded in ref-
policy, and they are sometimes included in macro
definitions . Thus, it is difficult to figure out which
configurations are enabled.
• Attributes
Attributes are often used for types and they increase
the time necessary to understand what configura-
tions mean, as shown in the next example. The line
allow httpd t httpdcontent:file read; is included in
refpolicy. httpd t is a domain for the apache dae-
mon, and httpdcontent is an attribute. To understand
what kind of files httpd t can access from the line,
types that have the httpdcontent attribute have to be
found by searching for type declaration statements,
which are sometimes embedded in macro defini-
tions.
2.3.3 Resource consumption
A security policy is saved as files in storage, then it is
loaded to RAM at system boot. Therefore, the secu-
rity policy consumes storage and RAM. Since refpolicy
is intended for multiple use cases, many conditional ex-
pressions and configurations for many applications are
included. As a result, the size of refpolicy becomes large.
For example the refpolicy included in Fedora Core 6
consumes 1.4MB storage and 5.4MB RAM. In resource
constrained systems such as embedded systems, this is a
problem because they often have less than 64MB RAM
and storage.
3 Approach to creating security policy
We propose a security policy configuration system
SEEdit, which facilitates describing configurations, veri-
fying a created security policy and creating a small secu-
rity policy. The idea of the proposed system is explained
in this section.
3.1 Higher level language: SPDL
The difficulty in describing configurations is caused by
the large number of permissions, complicated macros
and type configurations. Sophisticated macros can partly
solve such problems, i.e., creating a small number of
1 {
# Assign httpd_t domain to http daemon
2 domain httpd_t;
3 program /usr/sbin/httpd;
# Permit httpd_t to read /var/www
4 allow /var/www/** s,r;
# Permit httpd_t to wait connection on
tcp port 80
5 allowcom -protocol tcp -port 80 server;
6 }
Figure 2: A configuration example of SPDL for http dae-
mon.
macros and removing nested macro definitions. How-
ever, type configurations are still necessary in such
macros. Instead of macros, we propose a higher level
language SPDL on top of SELinux Policy Language.
SPDL aims to reduce the number of configuration ele-
ments by integrated permissions where related SELinux
permissions are grouped. In addition, SPDL removes
type configurations by identifying resources with their
names. An example of configuration by SPDL is shown
in Figure 2. The configured access rules are almost the
same as Figure 1, but SPDL is simpler. Permissions re-
lated to reading files and directories are merged to inte-
grated permission r and permissions to wait for connec-
tion on ports are merged to server. Additionally, names
such as /var/www and port 80 are used to identify re-
sources and assigning types to resources is not neces-
sary. To apply SPDL configurations, the SPDL converter
translates these configurations to SELinux policy lan-
guage, i.e. SPDL converter generates the necessary type
configurations, and expands integrated permissions to re-
lated SELinux permissions.
The difficulty in verifying refpolicy is caused by two
factors. First is the complicated configuration elements
such as macros, permissions, attributes and conditional
expressions. This complexity is solved by SPDL. Second
is that many lines of configurations for access rules for
applications not installed in the system and for rules dis-
abled by conditional expressions are included. Our ap-
proach to solve the problem of many configuration lines
is to describe only necessary configurations by SPDL
without refpolicy, i.e. write configurations only for ap-
plications installed in the target system. Since neither
conditional configurations nor configurations for unused
applications are included, the number of configuration
lines are expected to be reduced. This also contributes to
reducing resource usage by the security policy.
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Figure 3: Typical process of creating a security policy
3.2 SPDL tools
In order to support writing configurations by SPDL with-
out refpolicy, we propose SPDL tools composed of tem-
plate generator and allow generator. SPDL tools aim
to reduce the number of configurations written by hand
during the process of creating a security policy.
Figure 3 shows a typical process of creating a security
policy and this process is iterated for each target applica-
tions. (1) Configurations to assign a domain to a target
application are described as in Figure 2 lines 2 and 3. (2)
In order to figure out what kind of access rules should be
described, access logs are obtained by running the target
application. (3) Access rules are described using the ac-
cess logs. For example, when an access log entry shows
foo t domain read accessed filename bar then an access
rule that allows foo t to read bar is described. (4) Run
the application again and see whether it works correctly.
If the application does not work correctly, run the ap-
plication again and add configuration elements until the
application works correctly.
Allow generator supports writing configurations al-
lowing access in Figure 3 step (3). We adopt an ap-
proach of audit2allow[12] to automate describing config-
urations, i.e. generate configurations that allow accesses
appearing in access logs.
Template generator outputs configurations in figure 3
step (1) by using configurations typical to application
categories. For example, most daemon programs require
access rights to create temporary files under /var/run and
communicate with syslog. To produce more configura-
Figure 4: The architecture of SEEdit
tions, template generator uses the knowledge of the tool
user about the target application, such as what kind of
files and network resources the application accesses.
4 Design and implementation of SEEdit
We designed and implemented SEEdit following the ap-
proaches discussed in the previous section. SEEdit is
composed of SPDL tools and SPDL converter as shown
in Figure 4. The security policy written in SPDL, called
simplified policy, is created by a text editor or SPDL
tools composed of allow generator and template gener-
ator. SPDL converter generates the security policy writ-
ten in SELinux policy language from simplified policy.
The design of SPDL and the implementation of SPDL
converter and SPDL tools are described in the following
subsections.
4.1 Design of SPDL
The main features of SPDL are integrated permissions to
reduce the number of permissions, and configurations us-
ing resource names to remove type configurations. SPDL
also has an include statement to reduce the number of
lines. The detail is explained in this section.
4.1.1 Integrated permissions
While integrated permissions reduce the number of per-
missions by grouping permissions, permissions impor-
tant for security should be kept. In order to include
such important permissions, integrated permissions are
designed from the viewpoint of protectiong the confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability of a target system. Com-
promising confidentiality happens when an unexpected
information goes out, and compromising integrity hap-
pens when an unexpected information comes into the
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system. Thus, permissions related to input and out-
put to files, network resources and IPCs have to be in-
cluded in integrated permissions. The other permissions
are privileges which can be abused to compromise avail-
ability and to facilitate attacks. For example, setrlimit
permission that controls the resource usage limit of pro-
cesses can lead to compromised availability. cap insmod
permission can result in installation of malicious kernel
modules. Therefore, privileges have to be included in
integrated permissions. The detail of integrated permis-
sions are shown as follows.
(1) Integrated permissions for files
Integrated permissions for files are taken from pre-
vious research by Yamaguchi et.al[13] because they
are designed to control input and output to files
and directories. The integrated permissions are, r
(read), x (execute), s (list directory), o (overwrite),
t (change attribute), a (append), c (create), e (erase)
and w (= o+t+a+c+e).
(2) Integrated permissions for network
Two integrated permissions related to input and out-
put are designed for port numbers, NIC, IP address
and RAW socket. For example, integrated permis-
sions for port numbers are server (wait for a connec-
tion from outside) and client (begin a connection to
outside).
(3) Integrated permissions for IPC
Integrated permissions for Sysv IPCs are send and
recv to control input and output to processes. Inte-
grated permissions for signals are designed to con-
trol sending each signal because SELinux can only
control sending signals. For example, integrated
permission k allows sending sigkill.
(4) Integrated permissions for other privileges
46 integrated permissions for other privileges are
designed. Almost all permissions about privileges
are included to prevent attackers from compromis-
ing availability and facilitating attacks. However,
overlapped permissions are merged as an excep-
tion. For example, SELinux permission capabil-
ity net admin and netlink route socket nlmsg write
overlap each other because they are related to
change kernel configuration of network. Thus, they
are merged to the integrated permission net admin.
4.1.2 Configurations using resource names
To remove type configurations, SPDL enables configura-
tions using resource names. SPDL statements allow and
allownet are designed as shown in Table 1 to enable name
based configurations for files and network resources such
as port number, NIC and IP address. To configure IPCs
domain httpd_t;
allow /var/www/** r;
Figure 5: Simplified Policy to be converted by SPDL
converter
# Declare and assign type
1 type var_www_t;
2 /var/www(|/.*)
system_u:object_r:var_www_t
#Allows permissions related to integrated
permission r
3 allow httpd_t var_www_t:lnk_file { iotcl
lock read };
4 allow httpd_t var_www_t:file { iotcl
lock read };
5 allow httpd_t var_www_t:fifo_file {
iotcl lock read };
6 allow httpd_t var_www_t:sock_file {
iotcl lock read };
Figure 6: Output of SPDL converter
and other privileges, allowcom and allowpriv are also
designed. Assigning types for IPCs and privileges is not
required in SELinux, but they are shown for reference in
Table 1.
4.1.3 Include statement
In order to reduce the number of configuration lines, the
include statement imports configuration from a file.
#include filename;
For example, when the file daemon.te includes access
rules commonly used for daemon applications, describ-
ing #include daemon.te; imports those access rules.
4.2 Implementation of SPDL converter
SPDL converter translates SPDL to SELinux policy lan-
guage. The translation process is shown with an example
of converting Simplified Policy in Figure 5 to configura-
tions in Figure 6.
The httpd t domain is allowed to read files and direc-
tories under /var/www in Figure 5. SPDL converter gen-
erates types from resource names. For example, it gener-
ates var www t type from filename /var/www, then out-
puts configuration to assign var www t under /var/www
in the first two lines in Figure 6. Next, it generates con-
figuration to allow access to the generated type as line
3-6 in figure 6.
When different types are generated for files or direc-
tories under /var/www, accesses to such types are al-
lowed. For example, when some domains are configured
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Statement Meaning Example
allow filename integrated permission; Allows access to filename using inte-
grated permission.
allow /foo/bar/** r; permits to read
files under /foo/bar directory.
allownet resourcename integrated per-
mission;
Allows access to resourcename using
integrated permission.
allownet -protocol tcp -port 80 server;
permits to wait connection on tcp port
80.
allowcom IPCname domain integrat-
edpermission;
Allows access to domain using IPC
IPCname and communicate using inte-
grated permission.
allowcom -unix foo t r; permits to read
data from process running as foo t do-
main via unix domain socket.
allowpriv integrated permission; Allows usage of privilege integrated
permission
allowpriv cap sys chroot; permits to
use chroot system call.
Table 1: Statements in SPDL to allow access to resources
allow /var/www/cgi/** r;, then configuration that assigns
var www cgi t to /var/www/cgi is generated. SPDL con-
verter also generates configuration for httpd t that allows
reading var www cgi t.
However, configurations using resource names do not
work well for files dynamically created by processes.
Dynamically created files mean files that are removed
and created again. In SELinux, when a file is removed
and created again, the type of the file is the same
as the directory where it belongs. This behavior is
sometimes a problem. For example, allow /tmp/foo
r; is configured in foo t domain. At first, /tmp/foo is
assigned tmp foo t type, but when /tmp/foo is removed
and created again, then the type is tmp t. Therefore, the
foo t domain can no longer access /tmp/foo. To handle
such cases, SPDL has allowtmp to configure assign-
ing types correctly. The syntax of allowtmp is as follows.
allowtmp -dir directory -name type integrated per-
mission;
This means files created under directory are assigned
type. When type is auto, type is named automatically.
For example, when foo t domain creates temporary files
under /tmp, we have to describe allowtmp -dir /tmp
-name auto r; in foo t domain, then type foo tmp t is
generated and assigned to temporary files.
4.3 Implementation of SPDL tools
4.3.1 Allow generator
Allow generator outputs configurations that permit ac-
cesses recorded in the access log. The process is ex-
plained by an example below. First, allow generator
reads SELinux access log, then extracts domain, resource
name and permission from an access log entry. When a
log entry is recorded that says httpd t domain process
accessed filename /foo/bar whose type is foo bar t with
permission file read, httpd t, /foo/bar/ and file read is
#Integrated permission
<macro value="allow_file_r" /> @@@
#Corresponding SELinux permissions
<secclass value="file" />
<secclass value="lnk_file" />
<secclass value="dir" />
<permission value="read" />
...<snip>..
Figure 7: An example of permission mapping file
extracted. The extracted information is not enough to
create SPDL based configuration, because the permis-
sion is not an integrated permission. In order to ob-
tain an integrated permission, allow generator converts
SELinux permissions to integrated permissions by per-
mission mapping, which contains mapping of integrated
permission to SELinux permissions as illustrated in Fig-
ure 7. In the example, recorded SELinux permission is
file read, then permission mappping is loooked up and
corresponding integrated permission file read r meaning
integrated permission r for file is found. As a result, al-
low generator is able to output SPDL based configura-
tions allow /foo/bar/ r;, from obtained domain, resource
name and integrated permission.
4.3.2 Template generator
Template generator is implemented as a GUI. Figure 8 is
a GUI to generate typical configurations. Users choose
the profile of applications, and configurations are gener-
ated based on the profile. Figure 9 is a GUI to gener-
ate configurations from the user’s knowledge. They can
input their knowledge to the template generator without
typing SPDL manually.
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Figure 8: Template generator GUI to generate typical
configurations
Figure 9: Template generator GUI to generate using
knowledge of users
5 Evaluation
5.1 Experimental setup
In order to make sure whether SEEdit works, we used
two typical systems for experiment. One is an embedded
system configured for a small server, the other is a PC
system configured for PC server as shown below.
(1) Embedded system
• CPU: SH7751R(SH4) 240MHz
• RAM: 64MB
• Storage: Flash ROM 64MB
• Linux distribution: not used
• SELinux: Linux 2.6.22
• Running services: httpd, vsftpd, syslogd,
klogd, portmap
(2) PC system
Virtual machine (VMware 5.5) is used.
• Linux distribution: Cent OS 5 used for PC
servers
• Running services: auditd, avahi daemon,
crond, cupsd, dhclient, gdm, httpd, klogd, mc-
stransd, named, ntpd, portmap, samba, send-
mail, sshd, syslogd
Five domains are configured for services running on the
embedded system, 16 domains are configured for ser-
vices on the PC system. Access rules are written for
these services to work properly. Memory usage of the se-
curity policy on the embedded system was also measured
to evaluate whether SELinux is applicable to embedded
systems. The memory consumption by SELinux was
defined as the difference between memory usage when
SELinux enabled and that when SELinux is disabled.
5.2 Result and consideration
In the experiment, we have successfully created security
policies for both the embedded and the PC system. The
process of describing configurations, verifying configu-
rations and resource consumption are reviewed and con-
sidered. At last, trade-offs in SEEdit are also discussed.
5.2.1 Describing configurations
The first step to describe configuration is using template
generator. To evaluate template generator, the assump-
tion of knowledge on the part of the tool user is nec-
essary because generated configurations depend on the
user’s knowledge. For evaluation, it is assumed that users
know how to manage applications, i.e: they know file
path of configuration files for applications, names of log
files, names of content files which applications deliver
and port numbers for applications. Assuming this, tem-
plate generator produced 52% of the lines of configura-
tion for the evaluation systems. For example, total 24
lines of configurations were described for http service in
the PC system, and 12 lines were generated by template
generator.
Next step is to produce configurations from access
logs by allow generator. Most of the configurations gen-
erated by allow generator were able to be used without
modification except for the following two cases. First
is allow statements generated for dynamically created
files. These allow statements have to be replaced with
allowtmp statements. For example, foo t domain dy-
namically creates and removes /tmp/foo, then log entry
foo t domain write /tmp/foo is recorded. Allow genera-
tor outputs allow /tmp/foo w; from the log entry. How-
ever, it should be replaced with allowtmp -dir /tmp -
name auto w; as shown in section 4.2. Second is con-
figurations generated from log entries which record ac-
cess to normal files. Allow generator outputs allow
/var/www/index.html r; for httpd t from log entry httpd t
read /var/www/index.html. When the user knows http t
domain accesses /var/www directory, it is better to per-
mit access to directory like allow /var/www/** r;. For the
above two cases, the generated integrated permissions
still can be used without modification.
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refpolicy SPDL
File 130 9
Network 453 14
IPC 45 7
Privilege 80 46
Total 708 76
Table 2: Number of permissions in refpolicy and SPDL
As shown above, SPDL tools generate most parts of
the configurations. In addition, to modify a generated
SPDL configuration is easier than modifying refpolicy
because the number of permissions are reduced as shown
in Figure 2, complicated macros are not necessary, and
type configurations are removed.
5.2.2 Verifying configurations
To verify created security policy, the difficulty depends
on the number of configuration lines. The number of
configuration lines in refpolicy is more than 100,000
with complicated permissions, macros and types, thus
verification of refpolicy based security policy is difficult.
On the other hand, in the experiment, the total lines of
configuration are 174 for the embedded system, 401 for
the PC system, and they are described with SPDL. There-
fore, it is easier to verify configurations in SPDL than
configurations in the refpolicy.
Note that verifying configurations written in SPDL is
meaningful as long as the output of SPDL converter is
correct. Another work is necessary to ensure the result
of SPDL converter. One possible way is a test tool. The
tool inputs configurations in SPDL and is run for each
domain defined in the configurations. Next the tool tries
all access patterns to see if only accesses configured in
the policy are permitted.
5.2.3 Resource consumption
The file size of the security policy in the embedded sys-
tem is 71KB and RAM usage is 465 KB. In the system
used in the experiment, storage is 64MB, RAM is 64MB.
The consumption of storage and RAM is less than 1%.
Thus, the created security policy is usable for the re-
source constrained embedded devices.
5.2.4 Trade-offs
There are two usability-security trade-offs in SEEdit.
The first trade-off is integrated permissions used in
SPDL because integrated permissions reduce granular-
ity. For example, integrated permission for file r means
read permissions for file, symlink and socket file. There-
fore, allowing read access to symlink but not to file and
directory can not be configured by r permission. This
can be a problem in the embedded systems used in eval-
uation. In the embedded system, busybox[14] was used
for system commands. In a system where busybox is
installed, commands are executed via symbolic links to
/bin/busybox(busybox executable). When /bin/ls is sym-
bolic link to /bin/busybox and /bin/ls is executed, ls func-
tions in /bin/busybox are called. If a domain foo t needs
access to busybox commands and is configured allow
/bin/** r;, foo t domain can access symbolic links under
/bin, and foo t can use busybox commands. However, if
a confidential command file /bin/secret exists, foo t can
also access /bin/secret. If access to symbolic links were
configured separately, foo t would not be able to access
/bin/secret. To solve this problem, the security policy
generated by SPDL converter has to be edited. Another
solution is to create a new statement in SPDL that en-
ables configuring SELinux permissions directly.
The second trade-off is the audit2allow approach in
allow generator. If there is a bug or malicious code in a
program, and the program accesses files unnecessary for
the program to work correctly, allow generator outputs
configurations to permit access to such files. For exam-
ple, if code that accesses confidential data is embedded
in a CGI program by an evil programmer, then a con-
figuration that permits access to the confidential data is
outputted by allow generator after running the CGI. To
prevent such a dangerous configuration to be included in
the security policy, generated configurations should be
checked by the SEEdit user. To help the check process,
a tool that evaluates generated configurations would be
useful.
6 Related work
Linux distribution Fedora includes security policy con-
figuration tools called setroubleshoot [15], SLIDE [16]
and system-config-selinux [17]. Setroubleshoot analyzes
access logs and presents configurations when an applica-
tion does not work due to SELinux access denial. SLIDE
is an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) to con-
figure refpolicy. It has features to aid describing configu-
rations such as input completion. system-config-selinux
is a tool to generate templates of configurations for new
applications. It can generate templates using a wizard.
The above tools are intended to aid configurations using
refpolicy. The purpose is different from SEEdit because
SEEdit does not use refpolicy.
polgen[18] is a security policy generator with a higher
level language. Users of polgen first describe template
configurations for the target applications using the lan-
guage, then run the application. Next, polgen gener-
ates recommended security policy from access logs. The
purpose of the higher level language of polgen is to de-
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scribe template configurations, and users have to handle
types and SELinux permissions after writing a template.
The purpose is different from SEEdit because SPDL in
SEEdit is intended to describe whole configurations.
SENG [19] is a higher level language for SELinux se-
curity policy. It is intended to replace m4 macros, not
to reduce the number of configurations and remove type
configurations.
Sellers et al.[20] also implemented a higher level lan-
guage and IDE called CDS Framework[21]. It is also
used in the FMAC[22] project in OpenSolaris. It en-
ables configuration from the viewpoint of information
flow control, but is not intended to simplify configura-
tions.
There is also work related to the verification of se-
curity policy. Apol included in setools[23] has a fea-
tures to query security policy, such as querying what
kind of types a domain can access. SLAT[24][25] is a
system to analyze the security policy based on informa-
tion flow goals. Analyzers describe an information goal,
then SLAT finds violations of the information flow goal.
Gokyo[26] analyzes the security policy based on Access
Control Spaces, then suggests configurations which vio-
late constraints. These tools are for SELinux policy lan-
guage, but they can be applied to configurations which
are converted from SPDL.
7 Summary
Security policy for SELinux is usually created by cus-
tomizing a sample policy called refpolicy. However, cre-
ating security policy based on refpolicy has problems in
describing and verifying configurations, and in resource
consumption.
We have proposed a security policy configuration sys-
tem SEEdit which makes creating security policy eas-
ier with a higher level language called SPDL and SPDL
tools. SPDL reduces the number of permissions by inte-
grated permissions, and removes type configurations by
name based configurations. SPDL tools help in writing
configuration by generating configurations based on ac-
cess logs and the knowledge of tool users about applica-
tions. Experimental results on an embedded system and a
PC system have shown that SEEdit resolves the problems
creating security policy and practical security policy can
be created with SEEdit.
8 Future work
There are remaining issues in ensuring the results of
SPDL converter (section 5.2.2) and trade-offs in SEEdit
(section 5.2.4). Another issue is co-existing with ref-
policy. Currently SEEdit can not be used with refpol-
icy because type configurations generated by SPDL con-
verter conflict with existing type configurations in refpol-
icy. SPDL converter has to be improved to resolve such
conflicts.
9 Availability
SEEdit is available from sourceforge[27]. It is licensed
under the GPL.
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